European counter-proposal on Ukraine

  Today (Monday 24th November), there were two encouraging developments towards a resolution of the Ukrainian/Russian conflict.

[1] A US/Ukraine joint statement put out 23rd Nov by the 'Office of the First Lady'.
"Both sides agreed the consultations were highly productive. The discussions showed meaningful progress toward aligning positions and identifying clear next steps. They reaffirmed that any future agreement must fully uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and deliver a sustainable and just peace. As a result of the discussions, the parties drafted an updated and refined peace framework.
The Ukrainian delegation reaffirmed its gratitude for the steadfast commitment of the United States and, personally, President Donald J. Trump for their tireless efforts aimed at ending the war and the loss of life.
    Ukraine and the United States agreed to continue intensive work on joint proposals in the coming days. They will also remain in close contact with their European partners as the process advances.
Final decisions under this framework will be made by the Presidents of Ukraine and the United States.
Both sides reiterated their readiness to continue working together to secure a peace that ensures Ukraine’s security, stability, and reconstruction."

[2] Reuters published (24th Nov.) the full text of the counter-proposal, drafted by Europe's E3 powers (Britain, France and Germany,) This counter proposal takes as its basis the 28-point U.S. plan (Seen by Reuters on Sunday 23rd),  but then goes through it point by point with suggested changes (and deletions). This, among other things, raises the size of the permitted peace-time Ukrainian army from 600,000 to 800,000, and adds detail to the way the reconstruction of Ukraine is to be financed.  

   This may annoy President Trump, but it may also add some constructive ideas on details of financing Ukrainian reconstruction. 

Trump's Plan for Ukraine

 Trump's Plan for Ukraine

President Trump's proposed plan for ending the conflict between Russia and Ukraine seems, to Ukraine and its European sympathisers, to be too biased in favour of Russia. 

Ukraine has to vacate territory, Russia  does not. Ukraine has to limit its armed forces, Russia does not. Russia started the war, Ukraine did not.

The draft plan [Ref1] proposes that Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian. This is ambiguous. The Charter of the United Nations is clear that it is no longer possible to conquer territory by force of arms. I do not think anyone could object to recognising certain territories including Crimea as being occupied by Russia, pending elections. That would simply recognise the fact of occupation. It would not confer 'ownership', nor any other legal rights or status.  

(Indeed the idea of ownership seems very odd in the context of states and territory. At least to those of us so lucky as to have been brought up under the principle of democracy; it is surely up to the people of Donetsk and Luhansk, not up to Putin, Trump or Zelensky, to decide whether (in the long term) they want to be part of Russia, or part of Ukraine. Russia should woo those people with cultural benefits, rather than by blowing out their windows with high explosives. )

The plan contains suggested forward commitments regarding Ukraine's membership of NATO and the European Union. These may be more sensible than the terms discussed above.  In the sort term, it does seem unacceptable to Russia to have NATO suddenly on its door-step.  That must be recognised. I have previously discussed the possibility that NATO could "guarantee" the independence of Ukraine without stationing troops on Ukrainian soil [Ref2]. 

There is nothing in Ukraine's dramatic gesture of rushing to fight with its giant neighbour that makes it incumbent on NATO to come to its aid. The power of NATO probably lies in the nuclear arsenal of the United States; the troops and the money may come from Europe, but the ultimate sanction is almost entirely in the hands of the 'gringos'.  If the US does not wish to use its weapons agains Russia it will not do so. 

On the other hand, if Europe does want to use its strength (economic and military) against an encroaching and bullying Russia, it should aim to prevail, and not just ring its hands and talk. The question of a European defence force may arise again, as it did before, but with far greater urgency [Ref3]  It is often argued that the best way to maintain peace is to prepare for war – and be very clear about one's own red lines and those of one's neighbours. 

References

[Ref1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cde6yld78d6o

[Ref2] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2025/03/no-nato-boots-in-ukraine.html 

[Ref3] https://ecfr.eu/article/the-four-pillars-of-european-defence/

No NATO boots in Ukraine

To the Editor of The Guardian,
Dear Sir,

No NATO boots in Ukraine

     It seems clear that Russia regards the presence of NATO (or European Union) troops in Ukraine as unacceptable conditions for long term peace, whereas we (in the West) think it perfectly reasonable, and Ukraine thinks it is essential. All that is understandable. Rôles reversed, we would think the same. Indeed we DID think the same, when the Russians placed missiles on Cuba. We were very lucky to have had some adequately flexible diplomats around at that time. 

    So I believe that this point should be conceded. It would have to work both ways, of course. NO NATO TROOPS IN UKRAINE AND NO RUSSIAN TROOPS IN UKRAINE. That is the only way to understand a neutral buffer zone. 

    (The "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 16-28 October 1962, was resolved on 28th October, by the Soviets dismantling their offensive weapons in Cuba, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a public declaration by the US agreeing not to invade Cuba again. The US also dismantled their missiles in Turkey. That crisis showed, de facto, that hostile missiles in Cuba were as unacceptable to the US as missiles in Turkey were to the USSR.  It similarly demonstrated that the US did not have the liberty to invade Cuba if the USSR did not have the liberty to protect Cuba. )

    It is axiomatic that our allies  are reasonable and can be trusted, while 'the enemy' is un-reasonable and un-trustworthy; such is the "the distorting lens of inevitable prejudice". 

    A logician can easily see what a politician and a citizen cannot: that our enemy will be liable to the same distortion and see the same asymmetry.

   (Ranyard West, in his last book ("International Law and Psychology", 1974) described a technique, which he called "inversion-substitution". He evolved it as a way of exposing the prejudices that inevitably cloud our judgements. He would take a piece of journalism that defended our actions abroad and attacked our enemy's, but would swap the names and the epithets of the adversaries, so that the value judgements were inverted. For example: "The {Russians} made a {generous} offer which the {cowardly} {Americans} spurned. ....."  The result is startling!  But salutary.)

Ian West,
BANBURY,

Ukraine1

Kyiv and Ukraine: 1564-1795

    The word 'ukraine' means 'borderland' in proto-Slavic languages. It turns up as early as 1187 in a Kyivan Chronicle, in the sense of 'borderland'; so where the population of one polity thinned out to uninhabited Steppe and fronted another polity, they could each refer to their borderland or their 'ukraine'. 

    However, by early 1600s maps were appearing with the capitalised proper noun Ukraine. Thus "Vkraina" and "Kyovia" turn up together on the Radziwill map of 1613.  In mid seventeenth century, Guillaume Le Vasseur de Beauplan, a French cartographer working for the Polish army, published a map of "Ukrainska" in 1635 covering the area from the river Don in the east to the river Dniester in the west, and from Kyiv south to the Black (or Euxine) sea. His book Description d'Ukranie of 1651 was very widely read and republished in western Europe. 

Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595 - 1657) 

(This section is the expansion of a paragraph in my post Kyiv3 it tells how, in an effort to free itself from Polish control, what we now think of as Ukraine passed into the control of Moscow.)

    Born c. 1595, Chigirin, Ukraine

    Died  1657, Chigirin. (Aug. 16, [New Style])

Khmelnytsky was the leader of the Zaporozhian Cossack  rebellion (1648–57) against Polish rule in Ukraine that ultimately led to the transfer of the Ukrainian lands east and south of the Dnieper River from Polish to Russian control. In summary: the revolt, with the taking of Kyiv and Lwów, was initially successful but, after repeatedly being let down by the Islamic Crimean Tartars, Khmelnytsky made a treaty with the Russians (1654).

Although Ukrainian born, Khmelnytsky had been educated in Poland and had served with Polish military forces against the Turks. He had become chief of a Cossacks regiment at Czyhryn (Poland), but quarreled with the Polish governor there and fled (December 1647) to the fortress of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, a semi-military community that had developed from runaway serfs, bandits, and traders who had settled along the Dnieper River (Zaporizhzhia="below the rapids"). There he organized a rebellion among the Zaporozhian Cossacks and, with the support of the (Islamic) Crimean Tatars, marched against the Poles in April 1648. His victorious advance into  Kyiv won him additional support from the dissatisfied peasants, townspeople, and clergy of Ukraine, who joined him in a mass uprising that enabled him to enter Poland proper and seize Lwów (now Lviv) in October 1648.

After winning more victories in 1649, Khmelnytsky made peace with the new Polish king, John Casimir, concluding the Compact of Zborów (Aug. 18, 1649); its terms permitted him to establish a virtually independent Cossack principality in Ukraine. 

That treaty, however, satisfied neither the Polish gentry nor Khmelnytsky’s followers. He therefore renewed the war in the spring of 1651 but was defeated at the Battle of Beresteczko in June 1651 and was compelled to accept a new, less advantageous, treaty. 

In the face of a growing threat from Poland and forsaken by his Tatar allies, Khmelnytsky asked the the tsar of Russia (Tsar Alexis) to incorporate Ukraine as an autonomous duchy under Russian protection. The Russians were reluctant to enter into such an agreement, and it was not until October 1653 that they approved the request and Tsar Alexis sent a delegation to the Cossacks.

Pereyaslav Agreement   Only after the Cossacks had suffered a further disastrous military defeat (December 1653) did they  receive the Muscovite delegation at Pereyaslav and formally submit to “the tsar’s hand.” Two months later (March 1654), the details of the union were negotiated in Moscow. The Cossacks were granted a large degree of autonomy (under a Cossack 'Hetman'), and they, as well as other social groups in Ukraine, retained all the rights and privileges they had enjoyed under Polish rule. But the unification of Ukraine with Russia was unacceptable to Poland. It launched the Russo-Polish war ("Thirteen Years’ War") which ended (1667, Truce of Andrusovo see below) with the division of Ukraine between Poland and Russia, along the Dniepro river, but with Kyiv allocated to Russia .  

Early in the Thirteen Years’ War, the Russians invaded Poland, but Khmelnytsky, not content with his pact with Alexis, entered into secret negotiations with Sweden, which was also at war with Poland. He was about to conclude a treaty with the Swedes, placing the Cossacks under Swedish rule, when he died (1657).

Khmelnytsky had sought autonomy for his Cossack followers but succeeded only in devastating their formerly flourishing Dnieper lands and in subjecting them to the rule of Moscow, which gained control of Ukraine east of the Dnieper and gradually curtailed their liberties, until in 1764, when Catherine II (the 'Great') of Russia abolished the 'Cossack Hetmanate'. (See my post Kyiv 4). 

The Truce of Andrusovo (1667) established a thirteen-and-a-half year truce, signed on 9 February [N.S.] 1667 between the Tsardom of Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. That this war trailed on for 13.5 years shows that neither side was vastly more powerful. In 1610, Poland had invaded Russia, captured Moscow, and taken the Tsar (Vasili IV) back to Poland in a cage.  But this truce seems to have  tipped the balance from Poland to Russia.

[Based on several articles in Encyclopedia Britanica and Wikipedia]

Putin's Point of view

Putin's Point of View

I recently discovered, more-or-less by accident, Putin's recent (July 2021) essay, on Ukraine-Russian relations; lengthy but honest and personal; his view of the relations that he thinks should subsist between Russia and Ukraine. I realised (by extrapolation) that there must be a very large number of people in the English-speaking world who do not yet know of this important document and I consequently felt a duty to point to it, and attempt to evaluate it as fairly as I am able. The Kremlin's official ENGLISH TEXT CAN BE FOUND HERE [1].

It is Putin's amplification of an off-the-cuff response to a question raised at his annual question-and-answer session.  Dated 12th July 2021, it clearly represents the thoughts building in his mind, that led eventually to the invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022.

My precis 

Mr. Putin used 2000 words traversing the history of Ukraine/Russia from AD 800 to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, covering much the same ground as I covered in my recent posts [2-6], and I think Putin and I agree rather well. 

He uses another 2000 words to cover the Bolshevik period (1917-1990), and in this he is much better informed than I; but seems balanced and fair. In the Soviet Union  "borders between republics were never seen as state borders; they were nominal [borders] within a single country". He is not pro-Bolshevik; he admits the famines, and the social experimentation.

In the last 2000 words Mr. Putin covers developments since the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the formation of the present Ukrainian state. In 1990 Russia and Ukraine were "natural and complementary partners"; their trade was considerable and mutually beneficial. Even in 2013 the two countries were close allies, with: 

"hundreds of agreements and joint projects .... aimed at developing our economies, business and cultural ties, strengthening security, and solving common social and environmental problems. They brought tangible benefits to people – both in Russia and Ukraine. This is what we believed to be most important. And that is why we had a fruitful interaction with all, I emphasize, with all the leaders of Ukraine."[1] 

It all went wrong in February 2014, when it turned out that the people of northern Ukraine were far more enamoured of the European Union than was their more-pro-Russian government [7]. It seems (to  Putin) that 'the people' of Northern Ukraine have been seduced/fooled by the free-running, capitalist, West. 

"This is also a disguise for the takeover [by the West] of the rest of the Ukrainian economy and the exploitation of its natural resources. The sale of agricultural land is not far off, and it is obvious who will buy it up. From time to time, Ukraine is indeed given financial resources and loans, but under their [the capitalists] own conditions and pursuing their [the capitalists] own interests, with preferences and benefits for Western companies. By the way, who will pay these debts back? Apparently, it is assumed that this will have to be done not only by today's generation of Ukrainians but also by their children, grandchildren and probably great-grandchildren." 

In southern Ukraine, and along the border with Russia, there are (no doubt) more Russian-speakers, and more commercial links with Russia.  

"and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are coming to us to work, and they find a welcome reception and support" [1].

Mr. Putin objects to the  government-imposed  hostility to Russia and to the Russian language; 

"And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors, but also to believe that Russia is their enemy." 

Comment

It seems to me that any arguments that support the right of Ukraine to free itself from Moscow, must also support the right of the Donets Coal Basin (Donbas) to be independent from Ukraine. Whoever governs the Donbas should do so with that in mind.

The southern and eastern sections of present-day Ukraine contains a Black Sea coastline, Zaporizhzhia's nuclear power plant, and the Donbas coal fields (though at fearsome depth). There is a lot at stake. For Ukraine to loose ¾ of its coast and all of its coal might render the state non-viable. It may seem to Kyiv to be worth fighting for, even if that south eastern region is Russian-speaking and hostile to Kyiv. 

There were right-wing paramilitary elements in the February 2014 rising, and there were pro-Russian paramilitary elements in the Donetsk and Luhansk [7]. There has been a lot of assistance/interference from Russia in the form of heavy weapons and advice, and maybe also personnel; and now also a lot of assistance/interference from The West to the government in Kyiv.

The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015 [8] were serious attempts by third parties to de-escalate the violence in the Donbas Region between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukraine state. Such a de-escalation would require both of the warring parties to see benefits. In the event,  neither party seem sufficiently to want peace. On that point Putin seems correct.  

        It is not at all clear how strong the indigenous pro-Russian sentiment is, in the disputed areas. Pre-emptive, illegal, and un-monitored referendums are unconvincing and unhelpful. 

I believe the world would like to see a Minsk-type cease-fire and some well-monitored referendums.

References

[1] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

[2] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2023/03/kyiv-1.html 

[3] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2023/03/kiev-2.html 

[4] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2023/04/alexei-razumovsky.html 

[5] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2023/03/kyiv3.html 

[6] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2023/04/kyiv4.html 

[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_of_Dignity 

[8] https://occidentis.blogspot.com/2023/05/the-minsk-agreements.html 

Please address comment to cawstein@gmail.com

Kicking

Kicking

A man (in a green pullover) by the bus stop is watching his two children playing on the grass some twenty yards away; and I watch all three. My mind wanders.

"Robbie! No kicking!", and the slight, weary, lift in his voice suggests that this is not the first time he has said those words.

I look more carefully at the children; the boy, a sturdy four-year-old, the girl considerably taller and perhaps six. The check seems to work. "Skilfully done Mr. Man-in-green." 

My mind wanders again. What a lot a child has to learn, about bullying, about getting your way, about consequences and avoiding consequences. What a lot of civilising goes into parenting; the making of a citizen. I am reminded of the books and offprints on Freud, Psychology and World Order that Father left us; his legacy, our inheritance [1,2]. Is selfishness primary? Is aggressiveness? Is conscience inherent, or acquired as vestigial traces of early training from childhood or even infancy? Is 'God' indeed little more than 'our father in heaven' writ large?

Robbie might wonder what is wrong with kicking; his sister usually gives way. Of course, he may get a walloping from his dad, or smouldering resentment from his sister. He may conclude that, all-in-all, kicking is counter productive. Or he may conclude that it is best not done in public.

Britain spent 180 years 'kicking' weaker countries into submission, till 1956, when, with the French and Israelis, Britain thought it could recapture the Suez Canal from the Egyptians. By the end of November 1956 these allies found that they had won the war but had alienated all the world (except for Adenauer [3]). They withdrew, humiliated. In April 1975 the USA had to accept their humiliating retreat from Vietnam, and again in August 2021 their retreat (with their allies) from Afghanistan. 

Perhaps 2023 will see the humiliating retreat of Putin and his Wagner allies from Ukraine. But he need not be too embarrassed; we can see this as an integral part of growing up; we might even say "Join the club". Anyway, his wasn't a war. (It is amusing to note that, in 1956, Prime Minister Eden apparently said "We [are not] at war with Egypt now.[…] There has not been a declaration of war by us. We are in an armed conflict." [3]).

Reference:

[1] West, Ranyard (1942) "Conscience and Society", Methuen & Co., London.

[2] West, Ranyard (1945) "Psychology and World Order", Pelican, Harmondsworth, London.

[3]  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis 

 Please address comment to cawstein@gmail.com

Kyiv4

Kyiv and Ukraine: 1764-1918

As mentioned in my earlier post, the 'heart' of Ukraine existed from 1654 to 1764 as an independent 'Hetmanate' in the Russian State.  (Polish 'Hetman', or 'Warlord', from the German 'Hauptmann'). That status ended in 1764 when Catherine II (the Great) abolished the post and rôle of Hetman.

Catherine, born Sophie in 1729, the German wife of tsar Peter III,  deposed and murdered her husband and assumed the throne as  Catherine II (1762 - 1796). Her first preoccupation was to refill the State treasury.  That  she did by expropriating the vast estates of the church. Her next ambition was to introduce political reform and intellectual enlightenment, following the best examples of Western Europe: education, consulting the nation, freeing the serfs, fostering science and the arts. But she soon realised that Russia was not ready for liberal democracy. Her power rested on the support of the nobles. Free serfs would have no livelihood. 

Catherine's next expedient was territorial expansion. Her predecessors, Empress Anna (1730-1741) and Catherine's virtual 'mother-in-law', the childless Empress Elizabeth (1741-1762), had shown the way, for the power of the Ottoman Empire to the south was diminishing. (See the map below.) 

[https://cdn.britannica.com/48/3848-050-2473BB98/russia-expansion-1300-1796.jpg ]

The land of the lower Dnipro can be called the 'right bank' (to the west) and the 'left bank' (to the east). By the Treaty of Eternal Peace (1686), right bank had been left to Poland, while the left bank + Kyiv + the land of the Zaporidsia Cossacks + people of Orthodox faith came under the suzerainty and protection of Moscow. Anna's German commander, Münnich, had reformed the army and established, in the field, that one Russian was equal to two Ottomans. He forced Moldavia to accept Russian suzerainty. Elizabeth devoted (perhaps wasted) resources combatting the Swedes and Prussian in the north west to scant effect, but in the south she gained more control over the Hetmanate on the left bank. 

On becoming Empress in 1762, Catherine II dissolved the Hetmanate. The last Hetman, (Krill Razumovsky, younger brother of Empress Elizabeth's 'partner') was retired as a Field Marshal of the Russian army. 

Catherine's own lover (Orlov, who had master-minded the coup whereby Peter III was captured and killed) was made a General, and in 1769 was put in charge of the fleet that destroyed the Turkish fleet off the coast of Anatolia.

Catherine's Russia continued to push south against the weakening Islamic powers. The Crimea was annexed in 1783, which provoked the Turks into another war, the Russo-Turkish war of 1787–1792. The Turks were again thoroughly beaten, losing control of the north coast of the Black Sea from Azov westward to the mouth of the Dniester, where Catherine II founded the city of Odessa to mark the occasion.

Three times Catherine and her allies forced the partition of Poland-Lithuania, in1772, 1793, 1795. On each occasion Poland-Lithuania lost territory to Russia and Prussia, and on two occasions to Austria as well; till in 1795 there was nothing left. 

        Catherine the Great died in 1796, and was succeeded by Tsar Paul, summarised succinctly by W.L. Langer as "a tyranical and mentally unbalanced ruler." He was assasinated (1801) in a palace coup, and replaced by his son Alexander I whose relatively liberal reign lasted till 1825.

Of course, there were plenty Poles left, and Polish- speaking Lithuanians, Belarussians and Ukranians. In the 19th century, though the population of right-bank Ukraine was mostly Ukrainian, the land was mostly owned by Poles or the Polish-speaking Ukrainian upper class. In fact, until 1825 Russian influence in the territory of modern Ukraine was largely military and bureaucratic; the culture and language was predominantly Polish or indigenous, what was called "Little Russian", or "Ruthenian" (the Latinized form of the name 'Rus'); that which we would now call Ukrainian. Education, such as it was, was given in Polish. The Ukranians were uneducated, and poor.

After the widespread uprisings in November 1830 which spread from Poland into other vassal states including West-Bank Ukraine, the Russians began a process of deliberate Russification [2].

Nevertheless, a Russian survey of the languages spoken in Kyiv in 1874 found:

Ukranian 39%

Yiddish 11%

Russian 10%

Polish 6%

German 2%

Remainder 32%

(According to the website https://translatorswithoutborders.org/languages-of-ukraine-interactive-en, the first languages in Ukraine in 2001 were:

Ukrainian 68%

Russian 30%

Romanian 0.7%

Crimean 0.5%

Hungarian 0.3%

Remainder 0.3%

The major 'second' languages spoken were Russian 36%, Ukrainian 20%, English 1.5%.)

The Pale of Settlement 

The surprisingly high number of  Yiddish speakers is worth a comment. Jews were not welcome in Moscow or the major cities like Kyiv, but were allowed to inhabit certain clearly designated areas which came to be called the "Pale of Settlement" [1] (originally west of a line or 'pale' down the western border of the Duchy of Moscow.) At the end of her reign, Catherine found the Ukrainian territory underpopulated and made several efforts to plant communities there. Specifically, Catherine sought to encourage Jews into Kyiv to trade, and Jewish farmers to farm in the underpopulated steppe lands of the conquered areas of Ukraine. 

Ukranian Nationalism

The year 1848 saw popular uprisings in 50 European countries, with varied results: in Italy, failure; in France, initial republican success followed by reactionary restoration; in Germany, exile of hot-heads; in Swden 18 casualties; in Denmark, gracious accommodation by the king; in Switzerland a new federalist constitution; in Poland, accommodation; in Romania, successful regime change.

The causes were as varied as the outcomes: discontent with absolutist monarchs, famine (potato and rye crop-failures), urbanisation and mechanisation, increasing populations, intellectual middle-class frustration and demand for more democracy. The chief link that brought all this to a head in 1848 seems to have been ideas; the idea of change, of self-determination, of nationalism. Clear examples of the rise of nationalist ideas are:- Finland, and Czechia, where the 'common' language was vastly different from the 'official' language.

The idea of Ukrainian Nationalism started in Galicia, the part of old Kyivan-Rus (or old Ukrainian Right Bank) that was granted to Austria after the Congress of Vienna (1815); perhaps because the 'common' language ('little-Russian', written in Cyrillic) was so different from Austrian German. 

A nation needs more than a distinct language; it needs a 'founding myth', its own distinctive set of  heroes, and cultural 'icons'. The Rus hero Rurik is a founder for both Ukrania and Russia, and Kyiv is an 'icon' venerated by both nations. 

It is a pity that Moscow tends so often to behaves in such a way as to alienate its neighbours . 

(The story continues; see Putin's Point of View)

REFERENCES:

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pale_of_Settlement 

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russification_of_Ukraine

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutions_of_1848

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_nationalism

Please address comment to cawstein@gmail.com