Proportional Representation DIY

Proportional Representation DIY

We are not Fairly Represented in Parliament.

    Leavers and Remainers will both be glad of one thing — that Brexit is now settled, for a generation. But was leaving the right solution?

    It will be well known to all who are the least bit interested in politics that the distribution of opinions in the House of Commons does not reflect the numerical distribution of opinions in the country as a whole; our parliamentary representatives do not represent us fairly.  Some people think this is a serious defect of our old fashioned, 'first past the post', voting system. Others think the present system is a good one because it favours large parties. (This opinion is frequently held by members of large parties, so may simply be the result of self-interest, rather than deep analysis.) Others don’t think.

    One consequence of the disproportionate representation in the House of Commons is that there can be a discrepancy between 'the will of the people' determined in a referendum, and the result of a vote on the same issue in Parliament. We saw that in the 3 years of political turmoil following the Brexit referendum of June 2016. (It is by no means obvious to me that the popular vote should trump Parliament; many of the issues to be decided are extremely complex.) But any discrepancy between parliament and country raises the question as to which to follow. If parliament were representative of the country as a whole, there would be little case for holding a referendum. We could elect MPs and charge them with untangling the complex issues.

    Another consequence of the present disproportional system is that the moderate parties of the centre (e.g. the Liberals/LibDems) get squeezed out. Similarly, small dispersed parties like the Greens (a significant force in Germany) are very poorly represented in the House of Commons. Does this matter? We must have a serious look at the advantages and disadvantages of the present system before we seek to change it. 

Some advantages and disadvantages of 'First Past the Post' (FPTP)

    The FPTP voting system favours two large parties, and thus polarises the politics of the country. As each party exists primarily to gain power, they must aim to appeal to about half the electorate. Each party must be distinct from the other, but not so extreme as to be unelectable. Each party, when in opposition, must appear to the electorate to be a potential ‘government in waiting’. This near equality suits the chummy atmosphere of the House of Commons, but leaves little role for smaller parties. Most general elections happen to deliver an incisive majority for one or other of the major parties; enough to form a stable government able to drive through unpopular policies. But is this good or bad?

    Take, for example, Thatcher’s victory in 1979. (Table 1) The FPTP system gave Thatcher 359 seats, Labour 261 and Liberals 9. Thatcher’s government was unassailable, even if unpopular. Proportional Representation (5th column labelled '=Seats') would have produced a hung parliament, on issues where Liberals supported Labour.

Table 1: Voting data General Election 1979 (Wikipedia)

Party	Seats	Votes	Votes/Seat	=Seats
Conservative	359	13,703,429	38,171	295
Labour	261	11,512,877	44,111	247
Liberal	9	4,324,936	480,548	93

    Or take the extraordinary election of December 2019 (Table 2). The conservatives won 365 seats and Lab+LibDem+SNP only 262 seats between them. An incisive majority for the Tories to enact any sort of Brexit they like. But without the  obvious support of the country. 

Table 2: Voting December 2019 (Wikipedia, corrected)

Party	Seats	Votes	Votes/Seat	=Seats
Conservative	365	13,961,086	38,250	309
Labour	203	10,292,632	50,653	230
Scottish Nats	48	1,242,380	25,883	28
Liberal Dem	11	3,675,342	334,122	82
DUP	8	244,127	30,516	5

    This cosy (but unfair) arrangement can occasionally go badly wrong if the big parties are rather even, or if there are too many smaller parties. In that case, our parliamentary traditions are poorly suited to forming coalitions, and we flounder. In February 1974, neither Labour nor Conservative party seemed to appeal to the country, and there was a surge in support for the Liberals. However, that only won them 14 of the 635 seats then in the House, instead of the 130 MPs that would have been their fair proportion (=Seats; see Table 3). Labour won fewer votes than the Tories, but more seats, and formed a gvernment.

Table 3: The election of Feb 1974 (Wikipedia)

Party	Seats	Votes	Votes/Seat	=Seats
Conservative	297	11,872,180	39,974	255
Labour	301	11,645,616	38,690	250
Liberal	14	6,059,519	432,823	130

As 23 seats went to 'other parties' (such as Scottish Nationalists, Ulster Unionists, etc.) even a Lib+Lab coalitions could not command a majority, and there followed 8 months of parliamentary stalemate, until an October election gave Wilson an incisive majority in the House. 

    This concept of an incisive majority is a dubious advantage. Govenors like incisive majorities; it allows them to formulate a programme and get it passed into law with the minimum of trouble. But are incisive majorities good for the country? Or popular with the governed? Opposition MPs are meant to scrutinise legislation, but there is little point if passage is a foregone conclusion. Attendance in the house often dwindles to a laughable extent. 

    One of the disadvantages of our present system is that the winning party in the House can represent a minority position of the electorate as a whole. We saw in the Thatcher victory in 1979 that a policy of deliberate unemployment and ‘anti-union’ legislation successfully defeated the Unions. But we do not know if that was the democratic choice of the country. And the Brexit election of December 2019, will doubtless "get Brexit done" even though the anti-Brexit parties have more votes. 

    Another disadvantage is the matter of ‘falling turnouts’. If your vote makes no difference, why bother to vote? Maybe you support Labour in a Tory constituency. Your vote is virtually thrown away, whether you candidate scored 10% or 90% of the Tory vote.  Constituencies currently see all the votes of 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th parties discarded; well over 50% of votes up and down the country are counting for nothing. 

Advantages of ‘Proportional Representation’ (PR)

     (1) There is something universally appealing about fairness. (2) People should not feel that their votes are not going to affect the outcome. (3) The German constitution instructs that minorities shall be fairly represented in the Bundestag. (4) The flip-flop nature of our politics, dominated by two main parties is, on the face of it, ridiculous.

Some disadvantages of PR.

     There are a number of different schemes that have been devised in an attempt to meet the criticisms against the FPTP system. But here I shall consider the case against PR as a class, for it has many opponents. 

    First, it is clear that PR will weaken the two ‘main’ parties. But is that a good or a bad thing? It is a disadvantage if you think that 2 parties offers enough choice; and this probably explains 80% of the opposition to PR. But (e.g.) the Green Party does have a valid position, not sufficiently represented by the 2 ‘main’ parties. 

    It has been argued that PR gives undue negotiating power to centre parties. Harold Wilson voiced this objection; he could see a Liberal/Labour coalition turning the next year into a Liberal/Conservative coalition with the Liberals continuously in government. The prominent Tory MP Andrea Leadsom objected similarly, writing to constituents in 2017:

 “Under PR, 10% of the votes are designed to produce 10% of the seats, but not necessarily 10% of the negotiating power in the House of Commons. Indeed, a party with 10% of the seats may be in a position to wield disproportionate negotiating power.” 

    However, this is a relatively simple error. Suppose the House of Commons contained 300 Tories, 280 Labour, 40 SNP. Suppose, on a Tory motion, SNP and Labour MPs vote against, and the motion is defeated. But the power that defeated the motion does not reside in the SNP portion of the opposition, it resides in all 320 opposers. The motion is only defeated when there are more MPs against the motion than for; each MP counting for one vote. We cannot fault that.

     Andrea Leadsom seemed worried that centre parties in a proportional parliament have more power than extreme parties. But that also is a mistake. It is true that, by siding now with this main party and now with the other, LibDems might appear frequently to win.  But no one can seriously advocate disenfranchising the moderate middle merely to give the extremes a chance to govern. Yet that is exactly what FPTP does. It is a lunatic suggestion. The bell-shaped curve of the ‘Normal Distribution’ shows us that in most respects and on most issues the majority are in the middle. And on any rational system they will win; not individually of course, but collectively, by virtue of their number. 

    It could be argued that a fair system, giving equal weight to each elector, will so favour the majority that it will get stuck in the middle. It will not be possible to break the mould, exit the European Union, Nationalise the railways, break the Unions. That argument has some weight. But there are clear arguments against oscillating back and forth from left to right; out, then in, then out. (1) It is unsettling. (2) It wastes enormous resources of time, energy and money. Are we the only country in Europe that nationalised its railways, denationalised them and then renationalises them again? The only country that eschewed the European Common market, then sought entry, then sought out again? (3) Our successive incisive governments are making of us a laughing stock.

It seem unlikely that we shall change our voting system soon.

     The LibDems in coalition (in 2010) forced a referendum on changing the voting system to an Alternative Vote procedure; not a truly proportional one but one thought to be a 'half-way-house' towards true PR. The idea of change was defeated, and it is unlikely that there will be a new opportunity to introduce PR in the foreseeable future. 

But we can have PR without changing our voting system.

     There are a number of different PR systems in operation in different countries, all of them more complex than our existing FPTP in Single-Member Constituencies. This simplicity is rightly seen, per se, as an advantage. So also the connection between the MP and a specific region; each voter can identify his Member of Parliament. This local connection is very nearly a complete anachronism as it is now as easy, and clearly more productive, to contact an MP who shares your views, than a hostile MP who is local. 

    There is, however, a system that retains the simplicity and the local connection of the present system but renders a fully proportional representation in the House. It is tentatively called PR by Weighted Voting in the House of Commons.

    Look again at Table 2. It can be seen from the 4th column that each conservative member represents 38,250 votes; but each LibDem Member represents 334,122 votes; nearly 9 times as many. It is only necessary that, when the House of Commons divides for a vote, the party affiliations of the Members in each lobby are noted and multiplied by the appropriate numbers in the 4th column. 

    I have called this Do-it-Yourself PR because we do not need an Act of Parliament to put it into practice. All we need is Hansard, and the above table (officially verified). 

Advantages and Disadvantages of PR by Weighted Voting

    (1) It is simple. (2) No modification of our familiar voting arrangements is necessary. (3) It retains the archaic geographical link between MPs and their constituents. (4) It is fully proportional; each vote in the country counts equally; none are thrown away. Middle parties and minority interest are fully represented.

    On the other hand, the power structure in Parliament will be dramatically changed. There will have to be coalitions. Parties will have to get used to doing deals, and learn a whole new etiquette (how to negotiate, when to stick with an agreement, when to break.) Something France, Germany, Holand, Scandinavia have been doing for decades.

    The whole argument depends on party loyalty. The 11 LibDem members in the House should not be compelled to vote on party lines, but they will be expected to do so, at least when ‘whipped’. This may seem somewhat vague, but the expectation that various members of a party will represent the policies of that party is inherent in most forms of PR, such as the 'second vote from party list' system in Germany. And indeed in our present parliament.

Conclusion

   The flip-flop of 2 party politics is ridiculous, and the unfairness of FPTP is indefensible. Though PR will result in 'hung parliaments' in nearly every election, it is not beyond the genius of the average European to negotiate workable and adequately stable coalitions. By forcing our MPs to negotiate, we might work our way towards a compromise that gains the support of a sizeable majority of the whole country. We should now adopt a form of Proportional Representation. PR by Weighted Voting offers a simple method.